Using golf play as a measure of leisure, we document that there is significant variation in the amount of leisure that CEOs consume. We find that they consume more leisure when they have lower equity-based incentives. CEOs that golf frequently (i.e., those in the top quartile of golf play, who play at least 22 rounds per year) are associated with firms that have lower operating performance and firm values. Numerous tests accounting for the possible endogenous nature of these relations support a conclusion that CEO shirking causes lower firm performance. We find that boards are more likely to replace CEOs who shirk, but CEOs with longer tenures or weaker governance environments appear to avoid disciplinary consequences.
"The Directors of such [joint-stock] 
Introduction
As reflected in the above quotations, the idea that delegated managers may shirk their responsibilities is both old and enduring. Models that incorporate moral hazard in the principal/agent relationship consistently include the premises that agents create value by exerting effort, effort is costly for agents to provide, and effort is difficult for principals to monitor. 1 In the context of publicly-held firms, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that one of the ways delegated CEOs may diminish shareholder value is by consuming excessive amounts of leisure. Although theory emphasizes the motivation of executive effort, there is little empirical evidence on whether it impacts firm performance and whether or not the CEOs of public companies exert suboptimal effort. Most existing empirical work in this area has instead focused on the (more indirect) relationship between CEO incentives and firm value. However, even if executive incentives are correlated with variation in firm value, the mechanism(s) driving such a relation remains unclear. This relationship might be driven by how hard CEOs work. However, without direct evidence, possible alternative explanations 1 See, for example, Berle and Means (1932) , Holmstrom (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , Haubrich (1994), Baker and Hall (1998) , and Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). may hold, such as the possibility that incentivized CEOs are just more willing to make decisions that elevate shareholder interests.
2
The scarcity of empirical evidence on the relationship between executive effort and firm performance may be driven by the fact that CEO effort is difficult to measure. In this paper, we evaluate fundamental questions involving CEO effort by using a novel measure of leisure consumption: the amount of golf a CEO plays. To summarize our results, we find that the amount of leisure CEOs consume is a function of their economic incentives, and that some CEOs shirk their responsibilities to the detriment of firm performance and value. In particular, we find that firms with CEOs in the top quartile of golf play (22 rounds or more per year) have lower operating performance and firm values. Our conclusions regarding CEO effort and firm performance are supported by numerous tests that account for the possible endogeneity of this relation, including a robust instrumental variable analysis. Furthermore, we provide evidence that shirking by CEOs is persistent across time, although those who consume the most leisure are more likely to be replaced when their firms have more independent boards.
To conduct this research, we hand-collect golfing records for 363 S&P 1500 CEOs from a database maintained by the United States Golf Association ("USGA"). Among other details, this database contains records for each round recorded in the system by participating golfers from 2008 to 2012. We argue that time spent on the golf course is a reasonable proxy for leisure consumption both because a plurality of CEOs list golf as their preferred outlet for leisure and because golf commands a significant time commitment. 3 In addition, playing significant amounts of golf may reveal an overall preference for leisure, such that CEO golf frequency is correlated with time allocated to other hobbies or vacations. 4 James Cayne, the former CEO of Bear Stearns, provides an excellent example of this pattern of behavior.
According to The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Cayne spent 10 of 21 working days away from the office playing golf or bridge in July 2007, the same month that two Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed (Kelly, 2007) .
The distribution of golf frequency in Figure 1 demonstrates that many CEOs spend a large amount of time at the golf course. Based on definitions provided by the USGA, more than 57% of the CEOs in the sample are classified as "Core" or "Avid" golfers. 5 The distribution of golf play also has a long tail, with the top quartile (decile) playing a minimum of 22 (37) rounds per year. In fact, some CEOs in the database play in excess of 100 rounds in a year! While some golf rounds may serve a valid business purpose, it is unlikely that the amount of golf played by the most frequent golfers is necessary for a CEO to support her firm.
Our first empirical tests focus on the relation between CEO incentives and effort.
Simple univariate tests show that CEOs in the top quartile of golf frequency own a significantly smaller stake in their firm than CEOs in the bottom quartile (1.09% versus 1.82%). This relation continues to hold in multivariate regressions, where we find that CEOs play fewer rounds of golf when they have higher stock ownership or stronger wealth-toperformance sensitivities (WPS). CEOs also play more golf as their tenure increases, which is consistent with entrenched CEOs consuming larger amounts of leisure. Alternatively, golf play is attenuated in firms with higher amounts of leverage, which may serve as another 4 An alternative possibility is that low frequency golfers spend time on different hobbies such as boating or tennis. To control for this, we conduct our analysis only on those CEOs who indicate a preference for golf by reporting scores to the USGA. This possibility biases against finding the relationships documented in this study. 5 The golf industry defines a core golfer as an individual that plays 8 to 24 regulation rounds per year and an avid golfer as an individual that plays 25 or more regulation rounds per year.
mechanism aligning manager and shareholder interests (Jensen, 1986) . Overall, these results support a conclusion that incentives are an important determinant of the amount of leisure CEOs consume.
We next consider whether high levels of CEO leisure represent shirking. In other words, does firm performance suffer when CEOs consume more leisure? We focus on the relation between CEO effort and firm operating performance (ROA) because this is likely to be the most direct link between effort and performance. We find that the highest levels of leisure are indeed associated with lower firm operating performance. In years where the CEO played 22 or more rounds, which corresponds to the top quartile of observations, the mean ROA is more than 100 basis points lower than the ROA of firms where the CEO played less frequently. This result is economically significant as the sample mean ROA is just over 5.3 percent.
Before asserting that CEO shirking causes firms to underperform, we must account for the possible endogenous nature of this relation. Although it is possible that lower CEO effort leads to declining firm performance as agency theory would predict, this isn't necessarily the case. An inference of causality is supported by the results of a two-stageleast-squares analysis using the average number of non-cloudy days in the states where firms are headquartered as an instrument for the amount of golf that the CEO plays.
Multiple supplementary tests provide additional support for an inference of causation.
First, we focus on within-firm changes of CEO leisure and firm performance and find that changes in the number of golf rounds that a CEO plays are negatively correlated with changes in firm profitability. Second, we show that the relation between CEO leisure and lower firm performance is concentrated in industries where CEO effort may be more important. Smith and Watts (1992) document the use of stronger compensation incentives in fast growing industries, suggesting that CEO effort is most valuable when firms operate in a more dynamic business environment. We find that firms in fast growing industries drive the relation between CEO leisure and firm performance, which would not be expected if causation ran in the opposite direction. These additional results buttress our conclusions that CEO effort is important for firm performance, and that shirking CEOs impair firms' ability to maximize profits.
Given the evidence of a causal link between CEO leisure and operating performance, we consider whether CEO shirking affects firms' market values. Assuming rational expectations, stock values should be derived largely from expected future cash flows. Thus, CEO shirking is more likely to impact investors' expectations of future returns if it is viewed as a persistent long-run problem. Our examination reveals that Tobin's Q is lower for firms whose CEO plays golf more frequently. In particular, CEOs in the top golfing quartile are associated with a Tobin's Q that is almost 10% lower than otherwise similar firms. This result is also evident when we instrument for the amount of golf CEOs play using the number of non-cloudy days where firms are headquartered, suggesting that a lack of effort by CEOs leads to lower firm values.
Finally, we consider the extent to which firms are able to discipline shirking CEOs.
Not surprisingly, our investigation reveals that the level of golf play is highly persistent for CEOs in our sample. We conjecture that although boards may not initially understand the preferences of their CEOs, they may later discipline those who reveal a preference for large amounts of leisure. This appears to be the case. In the overall sample, we find that higher golf play is associated with a higher probability of CEO turnover. We provide some evidence that this relationship is more acute for firms with more independent boards and for CEOs who are earlier in their tenure. The loss of job security faced by new CEOs who frequently play golf in a given year appears to be somewhat effective, as evidenced by the fact that those who are retained are less likely than longer-tenured CEOs to persist in this behavior. However, the evidence for long-tenured CEOs is more consistent with entrenchment. Not only are they more likely to be frequent golfers, but they are more persistent in the amount they play from year to year.
This paper continues as follows. In Section II, we discuss the related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section III discusses the data, identification, and summary statistics.
Multivariate results are discussed in Section IV and Section V concludes.
Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
As mentioned in the introduction, economists have long warned of the possibility that agents will shirk their delegated responsibilities. In the context of leadership of a public corporation, the issue is summarized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as follows:
[I]t is likely that the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager's ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and it can result in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it otherwise could be.
The above quotation succinctly describes the views that (i) executive effort is an important determinant of firm performance, and that (ii) executives will not be motivated to exert the effort necessary to maximize firm performance and value without proper incentives. In this section, we formalize four hypotheses related to executive effort in order to test fundamental agency theories.
The first hypothesis we consider is whether a CEO's effort is a function of her economic incentives. Prior researchers provide evidence that CEOs' incentives may not be sufficient to elicit high levels of effort (see, for examples, Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Fried, 2003, 2004) . However, existing literature provides only a paucity of evidence regarding whether or not CEOs actually respond to greater incentives by working harder. The limited evidence on this topic is confined to either small samples or to private firms. Yermack (2014) analyzes the travel records of a small set of 66 public company CEOs and finds that these CEOs spend more time away from firm headquarters when they have lower ownership in their firms. Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005) focus on privately-owned firms and find a relation between an entrepreneur's contractual incentives and their effort level. 6 While both studies provide some evidence on the relation between incentives and executive effort, it is not clear whether these findings can be generalized for a large sample of publicly traded firms.
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If each firm reaches an optimal contract with their CEO based on arms-length negotiations we would expect any observed heterogeneity of CEO incentives (and effort) to reflect the varying needs of firms (Holmstrom, 1979) and we would not expect to find a relation between observed CEO effort levels and firm performance. However, it is reasonable to doubt that such an equilibrium could accurately characterize all firms, all the time. A prevailing alternative view is that CEO incentive levels may be insufficient on average due to outside social pressures (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) or managerial power over the negotiating process Fried, 2003, 2004) . Some firms might also make mistakes. As pointed out by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) , the technology of compensation arrangements evolves as some mechanisms are more successful than others, and firms often experiment and 6 By focusing on private firms, they are able to construct a measure of effort based on data taken from the (1989 -2001) sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board. In addition to other topics, the survey asked participants about the attributes of private firms they controlled and the number of hours they worked per week. 7 Regarding private firms, the model in Bitler, et al (2005) has to accommodate issues of voting control that are important for private but not public firms. In addition, as the authors indicate, there are a host of other potentially-important incentive alignment mechanisms for managers of public firms that do not play a significant role in private firms including reputational capital, competitive labor markets, and the threat of takeover or bankruptcy. Equity incentives may therefore not be needed to motivate optimal effort by public firm executives. learn as they go along. Another alternative described by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Zingales (1998) is that firms may originally set optimal contracts for their CEOs but the incentives may become inefficient over time due to the high costs of continual renegotiation.
Survey of Consumer Finances
A final possibility is that incentive contracts end up being ineffective for particular CEOs because of their personal idiosyncrasies. For example, some individuals may choose a greater amount of leisure once they achieve the goal of becoming CEO, and typical incentive arrangements may not be adequate to motivate them to act otherwise. Alternatively, some
CEOs may start off being very diligent but slack off over time due to changing preferences or circumstances. According to The Wall Street Journal, a recent Harvard Medical School survey found that over 90 percent of senior leaders report feeling some level of burnout and one-third indicate that they have experienced an extreme level of burnout (Kwoh, 2013) .
The second hypothesis that we consider is whether some CEOs exert suboptimal levels of effort. We operationalize this idea by investigating the relationship between CEO effort and a firm's operating performance. In effect, our hypothesis serves as a joint test of i) the assumption by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that CEO effort matters, and ii) that some CEOs choose effort levels that are insufficient to maximize firm performance and value.
Some extant studies consider whether distracted CEOs have a negative impact on firms' operating performance. Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007, 2012) investigate a sample of small Danish firms and show that operating performance declines following the death of a CEO's close relative or when a CEO spends more time in the hospital. Malmendier and Tate (2009) finds that superstar CEOs are more likely to accept outside engagements that enhance personal wealth and utility, including book writing and additional board service, and that this corresponds to declining firm performance. What differentiates our research design from these other studies is that our study evaluates how CEOs respond to their firm-specific economic incentives and whether there is evidence of CEO shirking, which is a more general problem faced by all firms that must hire and incentivize executives. (Morck, Shliefer, Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) . Some researchers argue that this reflects the fact that agency costs are high when CEO ownership is low because they don't have incentives to work, and also when ownership is high because they don't face market discipline (Stultz, 1988) . Other researchers offer an equilibrium view of firm structures consistent with the observed relation between CEO incentives and market valuations. For example, Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) propose a model based on assumptions about the relative productivity of labor and capital that delivers reasonable justifications for the non-linear ownership/Tobin's Q relation in the absence of agency problems. Because our sample is drawn from the S&P 1500, the level of CEO ownership in our sample firms is generally below the levels where a CEO could be insulated from market pressure through their voting strength alone. Our analysis may therefore only provide insight on whether the relation between low CEO incentives and firm value reflect a lack of managerial effort and are unlikely to speak to agency problems associated with high levels of executive ownership.
Our final hypothesis explores whether firms discipline shirking CEOs. As mentioned above, depending upon their preferences, it may be impossible for boards to adequately incentivize some CEOs with conventional compensation arrangements. We conjecture that firms may therefore be more likely to fire CEOs who consume excessive amounts of leisure. Harris & Holmstrom (1982) outline a model where uncertainty about agents is reduced over time. Although boards may mistakenly hire CEOs who have strong preferences for leisure, they may learn about those preferences over time and respond accordingly.
We also expect that CEOs who play large amounts of golf early in their tenures are more likely to be fired than those who are long-tenured. CEOs may face less discipline as their tenure increases, and they may choose to shirk more as they become more entrenched. Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010) provide evidence that CEOs become more entrenched as their tenures increase, causing agency problems to be exacerbated. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2014) demonstrate that this may be at least partially due to the fact that over time CEOs have a hand in appointing a larger fraction of directors.
Data

Sample Construction
We obtain round-by-round golfing records for a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs during the sample period from 2008 to 2012 using the USGA's Golf Handicap and Information Network (GHIN) database. The GHIN database contains all self-reported golf rounds for USGA members and is maintained in order to verify golfers' handicaps and round histories.
The variables available for each round recorded in the database include the month and year of play, course difficulty (i.e. rating and slope), golfer's score, and whether the round was played at the golfer's home course. In addition, the database includes the golfer's handicap and a list of courses where she is a member.
In order to obtain historical golfing records for S&P 1500 CEOs, we search the database for CEOs' names. Sample CEOs are identified when there is a unique name match, the golfer is a member of a course that is located within 60 miles of the firm's headquarters, and the golf course membership is considered "exclusive" (i.e. private and expensive). 9 Our algorithm identifies 363 golfing CEOs. To restrict our sample to firm-years where CEOs' full golfing history is available, we only include years where CEOs' first rounds in the system appears prior to the second quarter of the firm's fiscal year. Our final sample is comprised of 1,207 unique CEO-year observations, which represent 16% of the S&P 1500 universe during this time period.
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Our analyses investigating the relationship between CEO golfing frequency and firm governance and performance require variables from several other publicly available datasets.
These sources include Compustat (accounting variables), CRSP (firm size, stock returns, and return volatility), Execucomp (compensation and incentives), RiskMetrics (firm governance), and Thompson Financial (institutional ownership).
Golf as Leisure
The frequency of golf play has several appealing properties as a measure of CEO leisure. First and foremost, golf represents an empirically measurable form of leisure in which a significant number of executives participate. According to a 1998 Accountemps survey, 21% of executives list golf as their preferred outlet of leisure. Second, golf represents 9 Our matching algorithm is designed to minimize incorrect matches, but we recognize that we are likely to have omitted a number of golfing CEOs due to the fact that we require a high degree of certainty to establish a match. For example, there are likely CEOs in the GHIN database that we are not able to identify because they have very common names (e.g. Joe Smith). 10 The universe of S&P 1500 observations consists of 7,519 CEO-years for 2,282 unique CEOs during the 2008 to 2012 sample period.
a leisure activity that commands a significant time commitment. Most rounds of golf extend beyond four hours, and this includes only the length of actual play. In addition, golfers must commute to the course and often spend a significant amount of time practicing or warming up on the driving range. Beyond the direct time commitment, playing golf may also be correlated with other forms of leisure consumption. Evidence of this correlation is provided by Yermack (2006) , who documents that the presence of an out-of-state golf club membership significantly increases the likelihood that a CEO reports using company aircraft for personal travel. In our sample, over 40% of the CEOs are members at multiple clubs and many of the clubs coincide with vacation destinations.
Although golfing is a form of leisure for most participants, some rounds of golf likely have a valid business purpose. "Business gets done on the golf course" is a common adage expressed by corporate executives and suggests that at least some rounds reflect an attempt to generate or solidify business relationships. 11 However, the observed distribution of CEO golf appears difficult to fully reconcile with this alternative explanation. Figure 1 provides evidence that some of the CEOs in our sample spend an inordinate amount of time on the golf course. CEOs in the top decile of the sample play a minimum of 37 rounds per year, and in one extreme example an S&P 1500 CEO played 146 rounds of golf in a single year! A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the minimum number of hours that a CEO in the top decile allocates to golf is more than 220 hours -roughly equivalent to 5.5 weeks of work. 12 These high levels of golf for some CEOs suggest a strong leisure component and appear 11 A secondary criticism of golf as leisure consumption is the increase in productivity from smartphones and mobile Internet devices. This criticism is tempered by the fact that many prestigious clubs actually prohibit golfers from using these devices on the course and in the clubhouse. A simple Google search of "country club" and "cell phone policy" reveals more than 3,000 hits and a cursory review indicates these policies are intended to restrict phone usage on the course. 12 We use an estimate of 6 hours per round to account for the time spent playing, commuting, and practicing inconsistent with value-maximizing behavior. However, to the extent that rounds in our sample are motivated by valid business proposes, this biases against finding evidence of the hypothesized relations between effort and firm outcomes. 
Summary Statistics
Leisure activities vary based on personal preferences and our research design identifies CEOs with a revealed preference for golf. Because we are unable to measure the leisure activities of CEOs without records in the GHIN database, we focus our analyses only on golfing CEOs..
14 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the amount of golf CEOs play. These CEOs play a mean (median) of 15.8 (10) rounds per year. However, the table also highlights the significant variation in the time that CEOs allocate to golf. In particular, for the bottom quartile of CEO-years, they play less than one round of golf. Alternatively, the top quartile is characterized by an average of 40.3 rounds (a minimum of 22).
When considering the total amount of leisure time dedicated to golf, it is constructive to consider that the amount of time spent practicing is likely to be positively correlated with the frequency of play. This conjecture is consistent with Table 1 statistics showing that the average golf score drops from 94.6 in the first quartile to 89.3 in the fourth quartile -a change from the 31% percentile to the 52% percentile. 15 As such, the previously mentioned estimates of time allocated to golf likely represent a conservative lower bound for the most frequent golfers, although it may also be the case that better golfers just prefer to play more often. 
Results
Univariate Statistics
We begin our analyses by comparing the firm and CEO incentive characteristics of subsamples of CEO-years partitioned by whether the CEO played above the median number of rounds of golf (10 rounds). Table 2 presents univariate comparisons across these two subsamples. The variables tabulated in Table 2 and all other variables used throughout our analysis are defined in the Appendix. We find no differences in the mean values of typical almost no statistical differences, with the exception of MTB, which is slightly lower for the golfing sample and significant at the 10% level. 15 This is based on the overall distribution of handicaps retrieved from the USGA. 
This measure of WPS can be interpreted as the change in dollar value of the CEO's firmspecific wealth that is associated with a one thousand dollar change in firm value and is analogous to the pay for performance from direct stock holdings and options as calculated in Jensen and Murphy (1990) .
Statistics reported in Table 2 show that the financial incentives of the CEOs in the above median golfing sample appear lower than those of less frequent golfers. CEO WPS is $9.30 lower (p-value 0.042) and CEO Ownership is 0.905% lower (p-value = 0.046). These univariate findings highlight a potentially important relation between incentives and leisure consumption across firms that otherwise appear similar. In the next section, we explore these issues in a multivariate regression setting.
Determinants of CEO Leisure Consumption
To evaluate the determinants of CEO leisure consumption, we perform a series of regressions using the number of golf rounds played annually by the CEO as the dependent variable. The independent variables of primary interest for evaluating the relations between direct economic incentives and leisure are CEO Ownership and CEO Wealth-Performance Sensitivity (WPS). We also include CEO Tenure to determine whether executives consume more leisure as they are in office longer, and may therefore become more entrenched (Yermack, 1997, Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2014) .
We include a number of other variables in these regressions to identify whether other forms of discipline or governance have an impact on the amount of leisure executives consume. These variables include the level of institutional stock ownership (Institutional Ownership), the fraction of directors that are not employed by the firm (Board Independence),
and an indicator for whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors (Dual CEO/Chairman). We include firms' debt to value ratio (Leverage) to evaluate whether the necessity of meeting periodic financial payout obligations motivates greater effort (Jensen, 1986) . We also control for the amount firms pay out in dividends (Dividend/Assets). A commitment to dividends could reduce the agency costs of free cash flow (Easterbrook, 1984) ; on the other hand, a higher dividend payout could also be an indicator of a mature stage of the firm's life-cycle (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006 These regressions, presented in Table 3 , provide evidence that executives' direct economic incentives matter for their consumption of leisure. In the first specification, the coefficient on WPS is -0.042 and is significant at the 1 percent level. Similar results hold in the second specification when using CEO Ownership, where the coefficient of -0.457 is significant at the 1 percent level. Both regressions indicate that CEOs with a larger equity stake allocate less time to playing golf. There is also evidence that CEOs consume more leisure as their tenure increases, which may indicate an increased propensity for entrenched CEOs to shirk. However, we cannot yet draw this conclusion without evidence that firm performance also suffers. An alternate possibility is that CEOs have a more reasonable worklife balance over time as they learn to be more efficient in their job. 18 We use enterprise value following Gabaix and Landier (2008) , who conclude that the enterprise value is a high quality measure of firm size. All results are consistent when we measure firm size using MVE. 19 All independent variables are measured as of year t-1.
Most of the fundamental firm-level control variables do not show up as significant determinants of the level of CEO leisure, consistent with the univariate statistics presented in Table 2 . This suggests that the extent to which CEOs consume leisure may be based more on personal preferences than on their particular work environment. An exception is that the coefficients on Leverage are consistently negative and significant, suggesting that CEOs work harder when their firms have to meet periodic debt payments. In contrast,
Dividends/Assets comes in positive and significant in each specification. This suggests that dividends play less of a disciplinary role than debt payments, and is more consistent with dividends indicating that a firm is mature and lacks good projects that require the reinvestment of cashflows. The third and fourth regressions in Table 3 include the additional governance variables and indicate that they are generally not correlated with the amount of leisure CEOs consume. These regressions also demonstrate that the relation between CEOs' direct economic incentives and leisure consumption is robust to the inclusion of these variables.
CEO Leisure and Firm Performance
Having documented that CEO leisure is correlated with equity-based incentives, we Age, and year-and industry fixed effects.
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The results of these regressions are presented in Table 4 Panel A. We find that ROA is higher for growth firms, larger firms, younger firms, and firms with higher dividend payouts. 23 We document lower ROA for firms with higher return volatility, higher leverage, and greater board independence. Our investigation also reveals a significant negative relation between CEO golf and firm ROA. In the first regression, where golfing levels are measured using the continuous variable Number of Rounds, we find that the coefficient estimate is -0.00023 (p-value=0.037). In the second specification we find that it is the most frequent golfers (Golf Quartile 4) that are associated with lower operating performance. The significance of this pattern is confirmed in the final specification, where we only include the 20 Quartile cutoffs are presented in Table 1 . 21 All of the results in this paper are robust when controlling for firm size using dummies based on decile cutoffs which allow for nonlinear relations. 22 The results are also robust to the inclusion of lagged ROA as an independent variable to control for persistence in firm profitability. 23 In an untabulated supplementary test, we find that there is not a statistically-significant difference in ROA across the golfing CEO sample and other S&P 1500 firms in a regression controlling for industry and year effects.
indicator for Golf Quartile 4. The coefficient on Golf Quartile 4 of -0.0115 (p-value=0.009),
indicates that firms with CEOs that are the most frequent golfers are associated with an ROA that is 1.1% lower than other firms in our sample.
Overall our results show that high levels of CEO golf are associated with lower operating performance. In the next section, we address potential endogeneity concerns to determine the extent to which we can assert that this is a causal relationship.
Endogeneity
It is possible that the correlations we have identified do not reflect a causal impact of CEO effort on firm performance. Both the level of firm operating performance and the amount of golf the CEO plays may be driven by some other unobserved variable. Another possibility is that low quality CEOs could cause firm underperformance regardless of the amount of effort they put forth, so they optimally choose to play more golf. A third possibility is that the CEOs of firms with poor prospects head out to the golf course, such that causality runs in the opposite direction. In this section we discuss the results of a number of analyses that cast doubt on these alternatives and support the conclusion that the relation between high CEO leisure and lower firm profitability is causal.
4.4.a. Instrumental variable analysis
We first conduct an instrumental variable analysis. This approach requires identification of a variable that is endogenous to the amount of golf CEOs choose to play (the relevance criteria), but uncorrelated with firm profitability (the exclusion criteria). We submit that a relevant instrument in this setting is the number of non-cloudy days in the state in which the company's headquarters are located, since golf is an outdoor activity that is far more popular when the weather is favorable. We also argue that this variable satisfies the exclusion criteria, since it is unlikely that the number of non-cloudy weather days would affect firm performance directly.
We collect the number of non-cloudy days in each year for each state from the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and conduct a 2SLS analysis. In the first stage, we regress the amount of golf CEOs play onto control variables and the average annual number of non-cloudy days where firms are headquartered (Non-Cloudy Days). In the second stage we regress firm ROA onto control variables and the predicted level of golf play from the first stage regression. In the second stage regression we find that the coefficient estimate for the fitted value of Number of Rounds in Column 2 is -0.0068 (p-value=0.076) and the coefficient on the fitted value of Quartile 4 in Column 4 is -0.182 (p-value=0.017). These negative and significant coefficients provide support for the inference that high levels of CEO golf lead to the observed lower firm operating performance. The AR statistics of 17.5 (p-value = 0.0001) and 17.5 (p-value = 0.0001), respectively, alleviate concern over bias related to the strength of the instrument.
4.4.b. First Differences
A second approach addresses more directly the concern that unobserved CEO quality might be driving the relation between CEO leisure and firm performance. The concern is that CEOs with low inherent quality may be associated with weak performance, and these CEOs may also choose to consume large amounts of leisure because the marginal productivity of their effort is low. Quality is unobservable, which allows for the possibility that the estimated relationship between leisure consumption and performance may reflect an omitted variable bias.
To address this issue we implement performance regressions after annually firstdifferencing the data and report our results in Table 5 . The dependent variable is ∆ ROA, which is constructed as ROA t -ROA t-1 . In the first specification of 
4.4.c. Firm Performance when CEO Effort is Most Important
The negative relation between CEO leisure and firm performance may indicate that CEOs allocate more time to leisure when they expect firm performance to be poor, possibly because there are few projects to evaluate. Although the IV analysis from section 4.4.a suggests that this perspective is not correct, we attempt to bolster inference by evaluating the relation between firm performance and CEO leisure in firms where CEO effort is expected to be most valuable. Existing literature documents stronger incentives for CEOs in high growth industries (Smith and Watts, 1992) , which suggests that CEO effort is most valuable in rapidly expanding industries. frequency and firm performance is concentrated in high growth industries, these analyses strengthen the inference that CEO effort influences firm operating performance.
CEO shirking and firm market value
Operating performance appears to suffer when CEOs spend more time away from work, but this doesn't necessarily mean that there will be a noticeable impact on market valuations. Since stock values reflect the marginal investor's expectations of future cash flows, the relationship between CEO golfing levels and firm value should be stronger if CEO leisure is expected to persist. We investigate persistence for high quartile golfers (reported in Table 9 ) and find an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.68 (t-statistic < 0.001). Given that CEO golf is highly persistent, it is reasonable to expect that investors will view firms as less valuable when CEOs are expected to shirk their responsibilities in the future.
To evaluate the link between shirking and market value, we regress Tobin's Q onto control variables and variables that capture the amount of golf a CEO plays in a manner similar to that reported in Table 4 for ROA. We are also concerned about endogeneity in this context, so we conduct additional 2SLS regressions that instrument for the amount of golf CEOs play with the number of non-cloudy days.
The results presented in Table 7 Panel A support our hypothesis regarding the impact of shirking on firm value. We find that Tobin's Q is higher for firms that are smaller, younger, more profitable, have higher dividend payout ratios, more independent boards, and are members of the S&P 500. Using the continuous variable Number of Rounds in column 1, we find that the coefficient estimate is -0.00223 (p-value=0.048). In column 2 we find that it is the most frequent golfers (Quartile 4) that are associated with lower Tobin's Q. In the column 3 regression that only includes the indicator Quartile 4, we find a coefficient estimate of -0.109 (p-value=0.028), indicating that firms with CEOs that are the most frequent golfers are associated with a Tobin's Q that is almost 10% lower than other firms in the sample. Tables 4 and 6 , we implement an instrumental variable analysis in order to account for the potentially endogenous relationship between CEO golf play and firm value (Tobin's Q). In Table 7 Panel B we present the results of a 2SLS estimation using the number of non-cloudy days to instrument for CEO golf play. The However, using the fitted value for Quartile 4 golf, we find a significant coefficient estimate of -1.725 (p-value=0.037). We also include AR statistics in columns 2 and 4, which are 11.40
Consistent with analyses presented in
(p-value<0.001), in order to alleviate concern over any bias that might be introduced in the second stage regression.
Do firms discipline shirking CEOs?
Thus far we have provided evidence that CEOs consume more leisure when their economic incentives to maximize firm value are weaker, and that high leisure consumption is associated with weaker firm operating performance and firm value. In this section, we consider whether and how firms respond when CEOs shirk. Responsibility for monitoring and incentivizing executives falls primarily to the board of directors. The board has the authority to select, and, when appropriate, replace CEOs, and Weisbach (1988) shows that more independent boards are more likely to replace CEOs when firms underperform. Boards that are more independent may therefore be more likely to replaced a CEO who shirks. In addition, if boards become less independent over time and this compromises their ability to discipline entrenched CEO (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2014) , they may be more likely to replace shirking CEOs with shorter tenures. This regression indicates that, holding all else constant, the odds of a CEO being replaced increases by 0.83% for every 1% increase in golf they played in the prior year.
We present additional regressions that investigate whether the replacement of shirking CEOs is a function of board independence or CEO tenure. We create indicator variables Strong Board and Weak Board that equal 1 if a firm's percentage of independent directors is above or below the sample median. In column 2 of The results in Table 8 that use the continuous variable Number of Rounds are consistent with the conclusion that CEOs who play high levels of golf are more likely to be replaced when their firm has a more independent board or when the CEO is earlier in her tenure. However, similar regressions in columns 4 through 6 that interact Strong Board or Low Tenure with the discrete variable Frequent Golfer are not significant at conventional levels.
The final question we investigate is the persistence of CEO shirking. Given the evidence that CEOs who consume more leisure face a lower chance of being replaced when their boards are less independent and when they have longer tenures, we evaluate whether shirking is more persistent in these instances. In Table 9 Table 3 ), but do not find significant coefficients. These results indicate that there is a high level of persistence in frequent golfing by CEOs and that the level of persistence increases significantly for CEOs with longer tenure and firms with less independent boards. Coupled with the finding that long-tenured CEOs and those with less independent boards do not face discipline when they play large amounts of golf, these results suggest that persistent shirking may be a problem.
Conclusion
This article evaluates the relations between CEO incentives, effort, and firm performance using the amount of golf that CEOs play to measure their leisure consumption.
We find that CEOs consume more leisure when they have weaker economic incentives to maximize firm values. In addition, we provide evidence that some CEOs shirk their responsibilities, by showing that firms with CEOs who play the most golf are less profitable.
These results are consistent with fundamental expectations of human behavior that motivate the exploration of principal-agent relationships.
The plausibility of a conclusion that some CEOs shirk is buttressed by additional analyses. For one, we confirm our results with a number of tests that control for the possibly endogenous relationship between CEO leisure and firm performance. In addition, we find that high levels of leisure consumption are more persistent for CEOs with longer tenure and firms with less independent boards. These results suggest that one consequence of CEO entrenchment that can build over time is that they may slack off and not work as hard as they once did to maximize profitability.
Considering the particular setting for our analysis, one must wonder just how costly executive shirking is across the economy. We have analyzed the highest profile executives of high profile firms in a time period of continuing scrutiny: CEOs of U.S. S&P 1500 firms during the period 2008 -2012. This setting follows many years of intense competition, innovations in governance practices, and increasing regulatory and investor initiatives. The emphasis on corporate governance has arguably been an important driver of large gains in productivity at U.S. firms over recent decades (Rajan and Zingales, 2004) . The extent to which firms appreciate the importance of aligning managers' interests with those of their principals is reflected in the fact that almost all large public companies in the U.S. have now adopted explicit executive stock ownership policies or guidelines (Equilar, 2013) .
What lessons are to be drawn if, after all the ground gained to maximize returns on capital in U.S. markets, there is still evidence that some chief executives of reputable and visible companies engage in this form of moral hazard? To the extent that the relations we have identified characterize the much larger group of executives and employees that are subject to less scrutiny, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the overall level of shirking in our economy may be quite costly. We expect that considerable value could be created through additional efforts to understand and minimize the impediments to motivating optimal exertion on behalf of the agents who control our business enterprises.
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